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INTRODUCTION 
Your Honor, Mr. Jones will come back to court.  He’s lived in the 
same apartment with his family for years, works part-time, and is 
putting himself through school.  He is not a flight risk.  I ask that you 
release him and allow him to return to court on his own 
recognizance. 
In five years as a public defender in the Bronx, I gave that pitch — 
or a variation of it — hundreds of times, trying to convince judges not 
to set bail on people I represented.  The arraignment courtroom, 
where people were first brought within twenty-four hours of an arrest, 
was nothing short of chaos.1  Within minutes of meeting a client, 
based on whatever little information I could gather in short order, I 
would appear in front of a judge to make a case for release.  
Sometimes I had strong facts on my side, such as a mother or family 
member in the courtroom to demonstrate that this person had ties to 
the community and wasn’t a flight risk.  Other times, especially in 
cases where the person was homeless, or had multiple prior arrests, I 
had a lot less to work with. 
Why did this matter so much? Because, based on little information 
and no time to give it thorough consideration, the judge would make 
a decision about bail — a decision with tremendous legal and life 
consequences.2  I would watch a judge set bail and wonder: does the 
judge think my client can afford this bail, and intends that they be 
released?  Or does the judge know that posting bail is beyond their 
means, and intends for this person to remain in jail? 
The arraignment decision to set bail or release someone dictates 
not only the course of that person’s case, but also of his or her life.3  
 
 1. See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL 
COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) 
(describing the New York City criminal courts and the high volumes of cases 
processed daily, especially for low-level arrests as a result of “broken windows” 
policing, that result in a system designed to impose social control, rather than 
adjudicate). 
 2. See generally DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO 
THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2006) (providing anecdotal insight into New 
York City’s criminal justice system, particularly in the Bronx). 
 3. See, e.g., Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 740 (2017) (finding that people detained 
pretrial on misdemeanor-level offenses are 25% more likely to plead guilty, 43% 
more likely to be sentenced to jail, and more likely to have future contact with the 
criminal justice system compared to individuals released pretrial); see also Why Bail, 
THE BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/why-bail/ [https://perma.cc/J7Z5-TYBZ] 
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This is no hyperbole.  When people are released, they are able to 
keep their jobs, go to school, be at home with their children and 
families, and help prepare in their defense.  In short, they have a 
fighting chance at that much-hallowed presumption of innocence and 
the right to a day in court.  If they are in jail, it is infinitely more likely 
that they will take a plea before seeing any evidence, often without 
the opportunity to properly investigate and consult with their family, 
loved ones, and their attorney about what to do.  Over the years, I 
watched people I represented plead guilty not necessarily because 
they were guilty, but because they couldn’t afford their freedom and 
taking a plea would get them out of jail faster than maintaining their 
innocence. 
Those bail decisions and their life-altering consequences are not 
unique to that Bronx courthouse or even to New York City.  It is a 
massive, nationwide problem that occurs every day across thousands 
of courtrooms in this country.4  Bail amounts of $5,000, $1,000, and 
sometimes even sums as low as $250 or $100, routinely stand in the 
way of a person’s freedom.5  At arraignments, a judge has three 
options: to release someone on their own recognizance to come back 
to court without any bail necessary, to set bail, or, in cases involving 
serious charges or a warrant or hold, to remand the person to jail 
pending their next court date.6  In forty-nine states and the federal 
system, judges can legally set money bail or remand, also known as 
preventive detention, if: the person is considered a risk in terms of 
failure to appear at future court dates, or the person is considered a 
 
(finding that people held on bail plead guilty 90% of the time, compared to only 50% 
of the time if they are released). 
 4. See, e.g., Katie Kannan, A Broad Push for Pretrial Justice Reforms from the 
States, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/08/08/broad-push-for-pretrial-justice-
reforms-from-states/STJtFCEULXsajIXbxk8GDM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9BXC-W67J] (quoting one expert as stating that bail reform “is very 
much a local problem that requires local solutions, but is national in scope . . . .”). 
 5. See Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of 
Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained: Hundreds of Thousands of Legally 
Innocent People Languish in Jails on Any Given Day Simply Because They Can’t 
Afford Bail, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality 
[http://perma.cc/FDY3-8F88]. 
 6. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, MOVING 
BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 5 (2016), 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RUG-BN2J]. 
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risk to public safety, or both.7  In New York, judges can legally 
consider only failure to appear.8 
The myth that perpetuates the money bail system — that having a 
financial stake in one’s case will guarantee that people come back to 
court and mitigate any public safety concerns — is unfounded and 
unsupported by the reality of how money bail works. 
In addition to anecdotes and stories, there is a growing body of 
evidence that money bail does not successfully fulfill its intended 
purpose.  For one, the vast majority of people appear for their court 
dates without any financial stake in their case.  In some jurisdictions, 
people appear in court at higher rates when released on nonfinancial 
conditions than on money bail.9  Second, the way money bail is used 
is fundamentally discriminatory and biased.  It disproportionately 
impacts people who are poor and unable to afford the price of their 
freedom.10  More insidiously, it disproportionately impacts people of 
 
 7. Historically, courts have used money bail to incentivize appearance in court. 
Until the late 1960s, the only purpose of bail or detention was to manage flight risk.  
In the 1970s, many jurisdictions changed their statutes to allow judges to also 
consider public safety as a factor in the pretrial decision.  Until recently, all fifty 
states allowed for money bail to be set to ensure future court appearance.  The 
majority of states, but not all, allowed for preventive detention, money bail, or 
nonfinancial conditions of release to be imposed to mitigate a public safety risk.  See 
generally Pretrial Policy: State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 29, 
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-policy-state-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/X7LA-U4WT] (collecting various reports on the subject, 
which were used by the Author, in conjunction with her personal experiences, to 
reach stated conclusions herein).  Over the past five years, all but one of the 
remaining states — New York — did not allow judges to consider risk to public safety 
amended their statutes.  Some jurisdictions are recent adopters of public safety; in 
2014, following the Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act, judges in New Jersey could 
consider, for the first time, public safety in a detention decision.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2A:162-15–26 (2014), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/PL14/31_.HTM 
[https://perma.cc/C4Z6-S88U].  In 2017, Connecticut passed the Pretrial Justice 
Reform Act that also allowed judges to consider risk to public safety for the first 
time.  CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-64a (2017), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2017/FC/2017HB-
07044-R000695-FC.htm [https://perma.cc/G6JH-BPK2]. 
 8. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (2012). 
 9. Supervised Release 2017, NYC CRIM. JUST. (2018), 
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SR-Annual-
Scorecard-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG2V-B4CX]. 
 10. This discriminatory impact, targeting the poor more than the wealthy, is true 
both nationally and on the municipal level.  See Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The 
Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail: America’s Money-Bail System 
Mostly Traps Low-Level Offenders Who Can’t Afford Their Freedom While 
Awaiting Trial, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-
not-making-bail/477906/ [https://perma.cc/3HLR-H5HX]; Arpit Gupta & Ethan 
Frenchman, The U.S. Bail System Punishes the Poor and Rewards the Rich, QUARTZ 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 
color, who are more likely to have higher bail set than whites and less 
likely to be able to afford bail based on historic generational 
disparities in wealth.11  The particular impact of money bail on 
women flies below the radar in most bail reform conversations, but 
research has shown that women in the justice system have less wealth 
than men and disproportionately bear the burden of paying bail for 
their loved ones.12  Finally, the discriminatory use of money bail leads 
to the deeply troubling overuse of jail.  A fundamental goal of bail 
reform must be to simply have fewer people in jail, given jail’s 
deleterious impacts on a person’s health, safety, and well-being.  The 
number of deaths in jail each year across the U.S., especially within 
the first few days of a person’s admission, is staggering.  This is the 
 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://qz.com/900777/the-us-bail-system-punishes-the-poor-and-
rewards-the-rich/ [https://perma.cc/YX9X-B3CX]; Malcolm Jenkins, Punishing 
Poverty: How Philly’s Cash Bail System Does More Harm Than Good, INQUIRER 
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/commentary/malcolm-jenkins-
criminal-justice-reform-cash-bail-philadelphia-eagles-20181203.html 
[https://perma.cc/VP8V-5XBL] (discussing the issue in the context of Philadelphia); 
Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html 
[https://perma.cc/992E-RPC4] (discussing the issue in the context of New York City).  
Prosecutors have also recognized the harms of money bail.  See Casey Tolan, Making 
Freedom Free: The Nation’s District Attorneys Have the Power to End the Cash Bail 
System. Some of Them Have Started Using It., SLATE (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/03/poor-defendants-get-locked-up-because-
they-cant-afford-cash-bail-heres-an-easy-fix.html [https://perma.cc/GFQ5-MWAF]. 
 11. DAVID ARNOLD ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., RACIAL BIAS IN BAIL 
DECISIONS 26 (2018), https://www.princeton.edu/~wdobbie/files/racialbias.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FN6Z-CEHA]. 
 
On average, black defendants are 3.6 percentage points more likely to be 
assigned monetary bail compared to white defendants and receive bail 
amounts that are $9,923 greater than white defendants. Conversely, black 
defendants are 2.0 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points less likely to 
be released on their own recognizance or to be assigned non-monetary 
conditions compared to white defendants, respectively. As a result, black 
defendants are 2.4 percentage points more likely to be detained pre-trial 
compared to white defendants. 
Id. 
 12. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, DETAINING 
THE POOR 12 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M4Q-3HWV]; GINA CLAYTON ET AL., ESSIE JUSTICE GRP., 
BECAUSE SHE’S POWERFUL: THE POLITICAL ISOLATION AND RESISTANCE OF WOMEN 
WITH INCARCERATED LOVED ONES 17 (2018), 
https://www.becauseshespowerful.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Essie-Justice-
Group_Because-Shes-Powerful-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFQ-DEGN] (stating 
that 54% of women are unable to afford money bail for a loved one). 
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same period of time that people are often scrambling to make bail.  
Sandra Bland, arrested and booked into jail on an alleged traffic 
infraction, was waiting for family to pay $500 to a bail bondsman 
when she died in a Texas jail cell three days later.  Within only one 
year following Sandra Bland’s death, at least 810 additional people 
lost their lives in jail.13 
In recent years, the call to end money bail has taken on an urgency 
and fervor unseen before in the fight to end mass incarceration.14  
Without a doubt, there is growing recognition that money bail itself is 
a relic of an antiquated pretrial system that perpetuates inequity, bias, 
and oppression.15  Justice reform advocates and organizers have made 
eliminating money bail a central campaign in the fight to end mass 
incarceration and abolish jails and prisons.16  In response to advocacy, 
 
 13. Dana Liebelson & Ryan J. Reilley, Sandra Bland Died One Year Ago, 
HUFFINGTON POST HIGHLINE (July 13, 2016), 
https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/sandra-bland-jail-deaths/ 
[https://perma.cc/TKE6-YSR7]. 
 14. Washington, D.C., was the first jurisdiction in the U.S. to come close to 
eliminating money bail in 1992 after passing the Bail Reform Act.  See D.C. CODE §§ 
23-1321–1333 (2019). The Act expanded the discretion of judges to impose preventive 
detention — no opportunity for release pretrial — and also mandated that judges 
could not set a money bail amount that would result in the person’s pretrial 
detention.  See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: LESSONS FROM FIVE DECADES OF INNOVATION AND 
GROWTH 5 (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Do
cumentFileKey=46b516e0-5ea0-a9a3-b070-ecd6bacd9ed0&forceDialog=0%20p.%205 
[https://perma.cc/8VKJ-2Q44].  More recently, New Jersey enacted the Bail Reform 
and Speedy Trial Act of 2014.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-15–26 (2014).  These 
reforms, implemented statewide in 2017, resulted in a 29% decrease in the overall 
pretrial jail population in New Jersey from December 31, 2016, before bail reform 
took hold, to the most recent data available on December 31, 2018.  See Criminal 
Justice Reform Report 2018 – Chart C: Supplemental Graphs: Nonsentenced Pretrial 
Jail Population, N.J. COURTS (Dec. 31, 2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport2018.pdf?c=aJS 
[https://perma.cc/Z5EN-4ZLR]. 
 15. Studies demonstrate the deleterious impact of money bail on people’s ability 
to make bail and how the use of money bail disproportionately impacts people who 
are poor, people of color, and specific communities. The use of money bail negatively 
impacts not only a person’s life, but also the outcome of their legal case. See Heaton 
et al., supra note 3, at 736–41; see also Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High 
Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 498–99 (2016) 
(concluding that money bail increases the likelihood that a defendant will be found 
guilty by 12%). 
 16. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ 
[perma.cc/7EJQ-6DF8] (noting that 99% of the growth in incarceration in the past 
fifteen years in the United States is a result of pretrial detention).  Criminal justice 
advocacy groups — both national and local in nature — have made bail reform a 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851 
litigation, and public pressure, some jurisdictions across the country 
have overhauled laws to lessen or eliminate the use of money bail 
entirely.17  At the local level, rural and urban counties as well as cities 
have enacted policies to do the same.18  Yet in all this pretrial justice 
momentum to end money bail, two fundamental premises of our 
country’s bail system have eluded any real scrutiny. The first is the 
idea that “failure to appear” is, by itself, a justifiable and valid basis 
for depriving someone of their pretrial freedom.  Another important 
standard that is ripe for reform is the definition of who and what 
ought to be considered a risk to public safety, and when detention can 
be imposed to manage public safety concerns.  
This Article argues in favor of three key reforms to bail.  One is to 
end money bail entirely.19  This proposition is hardly novel or 
 
signature campaign.  See Ending Mass Incarceration in New York State – Policy 
Demands: #FREEnewyork, JUSTLEADERSHIPUSA (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://justleadershipusa.org/campaign/freenewyork/ [https://perma.cc/PG3E-UGEF]; 
see also JusticeLA Issues Letter to L.A. County Board of Supervisors As Future of 
Bail Reform Hangs in the Balance with SB 10, JUSTICELA CAMPAIGN (June 16, 
2018), http://justicelanow.org/justicela-issues-letter-to-l-a-county-board-of-
supervisors-as-future-of-bail-reform-hangs-in-the-balance-with-sb-10/ 
[https://perma.cc/3FSR-75NK]. 
 17. See Pretrial Policy: State Laws, supra note 7. 
 18. Many of the most important recent reforms to bail have happened at the local 
level, often as a result of a settlement from litigation or a rule or policy change made 
by local stakeholders.  For example, in July 2017, Chief Judge Timothy Evans of 
Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) issued General Order 18.8A, which required the 
courts to consider nonfinancial conditions of release and, if setting money bail, to 
consider a person’s ability to pay bail. Gen. Ord. Cook Co. Cir. Ct. 18.8A (Eff. Sept. 
18, 2017), 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Orders/General%20Order%20No.%2018.8
a.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM4J-V8LJ].  In Harris County, Texas (Houston), judges 
recently passed Rule 9, Initial Bail Schedule and Early Presentment, rescinding the 
county’s bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses and requiring that the majority of 
people arrested on misdemeanor charges be released on personal bond (i.e., released 
on recognizance) or nonfinancial conditions of release and, if money bail is imposed, 
it must only be set after an individualized determination of ability to pay. 
 19. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Shaila Dewan, When Bail Feels Less Like 
Freedom, More Like Extortion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/bail-bonds-extortion.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YEH-MXBC]; CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL, supra note 6; Ann E. Marimow, When It Comes to Pretrial Release, 
Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-
release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-
073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.e3068409b8ed [https://perma.cc/5Z2T-H87F]; 
JUSTICE POL’Y INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF 
USING MONEY FOR BAIL 17 (2012), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EA5G-8XNQ]. 
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controversial among pretrial justice advocates.  The second reform is 
to eliminate risk of failure to appear entirely as a basis for imposing 
detention.  To a limited degree, some jurisdictions have embraced this 
reform by eliminating both bail and jail on very low-level offenses, 
but I argue that this reform should be given real consideration on all 
levels of charges — both minor and serious — given what the 
research tells us about pretrial court appearance.  The third 
recommendation is one that is truly novel and has not yet been 
broached in any jurisdiction: to redefine what constitutes a risk to 
public safety as only conduct that involves a specific threat to a 
person’s physical safety, and to justify pretrial detention based on this 
factor only after an individualized, fact-specific hearing has been held 
on the potential threat of danger. This reform in particular has 
received relatively little attention in the bail reform debate, despite its 
potential to transform the pretrial process. 
In subsequent sections, I provide a brief history of the money bail 
system and the goals of court appearance and public safety.  I then 
turn to the problems of the current money bail system and challenge 
the premise that money bail mitigates either failure to appear or 
public safety concerns.  I provide an account of public safety and bail, 
highlighting the ethical and practical problems with predicting future 
risk to public safety, and how these concerns are compounded by the 
use of money bail.  Finally, I offer solutions — and cautionary advice 
— based on lessons learned from California and New York, the two 
most prominent examples of bail reform in recent times. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY BAIL 
For centuries, the purpose of money bail was to ensure pretrial 
court appearance.20  Yet, given research that suggests money has little 
impact on court appearance, should this premise still stand?  What if 
courts, judges, and magistrates no longer use either money bail or 
detention to manage risk of failure to appear?  And, with the changes 
in the law in recent decades that allow judges to consider risk to 
public safety as well as failure to appear, should the purpose of 
detention only be to manage and mitigate danger?  Put another way, 
if a person poses no danger or risk to public safety, regardless of 
charge, should they always be released?  I would argue yes, and a 
growing number of experts, practitioners, and advocates would agree. 
To eliminate the idea of failure to appear would be a radical shift in 
both the purpose and practice of bail, upending centuries of legal 
 
 20. JUSTICE POL’Y INST., supra note 19, at 6. 
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tradition in this country.21  If implemented, it would mean that the 
only basis for depriving people of their pretrial liberty would be if 
they pose a danger or a risk to public safety.  Importantly, under this 
new bail regime, money could not sensibly continue to play a role in 
the American pretrial system, as it has even less meaningful relevance 
to managing risk to public safety than it does to managing failure to 
appear. 
If risk to public safety were to become the only factor in the 
calculus of bail and detention, there would need to be careful 
formulation of what is a risk to public safety.  In other words, what 
kinds of charges indicate that someone is a danger?  How should that 
risk or danger be assessed?  And what due process safeguards are 
necessary to prevent overreach? 
Before diving into these arguments, it is important to understand a 
brief history of the money bail system, including the original purpose 
of securing court appearance and mitigating against failure to appear, 
and, more recently, the use of bail and preventive detention to 
manage risk to public safety.  I explain how these concepts developed 
and the role they have played in driving mass incarceration as we 
know it today.  This historical perspective is necessary to 
understanding the crisis of the current bail system, the urgency of 
reform, and the basis for potential solutions that focus on eliminating 
failure to appear from the schema of bail and transforming the notion 
of danger and public safety. 
A. The Role of Money in Securing Pretrial Appearance 
For centuries, guaranteeing court appearance was the only basis for 
setting money bail in the United States.22  Modeled on the use of bail 
in English law, the early American bail system was based on a simple 
premise — people must appear for future court dates, and a financial 
stake in one’s case was, at that time, the best way to guarantee they 
appear in court.23  Importantly, bail was historically used as a 
 
 21. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR 
AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 38 (2014), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/028360.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2NL-
42XB] [hereinafter SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL]. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Like the ancient practice of securing 
the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern 
practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to 
forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused.  Bail set at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is 
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mechanism for release.24  Until the 1800s, the typical kind of bail set 
was what amounted to an unsecured bond vouched for by a surety, 
either the accused themselves, or a friend or family member.25  
Essentially, the bond was an oath, a promise to appear in court, and if 
the accused absconded or failed to appear the surety would be liable 
for the amount of bail attached to that unsecured bond.26 
The late 1800s saw the birth of the commercial bail industry — bail 
bond agents, bail bondsmen, and bail bond companies.27  By the early 
twentieth century, commercial bail agencies had established a 
stronghold in the American bail system and usurped the role 
traditionally played by personal sureties.28  In addition to replacing 
personal sureties — the family members, friends and the like that 
would guarantee bail — the commercial bail industry introduced the 
concept of profit into the bail decision.29  If a personal surety posted 
some amount of bail to the court, that money would be returned as 
long as the person made all their court appearances.30  In contrast, 
commercial bail agencies required an upfront payment, usually 10% 
of the total bail amount, and kept that deposit regardless of whether 
the person appeared and even if the charges were ultimately 
dismissed.31 
Today, bail bond companies are one of the driving forces behind 
the current money bail system and the fight against bail reform.  
Despite being regulated by government agencies,32 the vast majority 
 
‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)).  Chief 
Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, continued, “[s]ince the function of bail is 
limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards 
relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.” Id. 
 24. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. CORR., MONEY AS A CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A 
DEFENDANT PRETRIAL 30 (2014), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/029517.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7AML-PR89] [hereinafter SCHNACKE, MONEY AS A CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER]. 
 25. See id. at 12. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. at 27. 
 29. See COLOR OF CHANGE, ACLU, SELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM: HOW 
INSURANCE CORPORATIONS HAVE TAKEN OVER OUR BAIL SYSTEM, COLOR OF 
CHANGE & ACLU CAMPAIGN FOR SMART JUSTICE 2, 14 (2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/059_bail_report_2_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8C68-9HR8]. 
 30. See id. at 3. 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. See id. at 36. 
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of bail bond agencies and bail bondsmen are backed by private 
insurance companies that insulate them against loss and operate with 
a certain lawlessness exemplified in shows like Dog the Bounty 
Hunter.33  Moreover, bail bond companies exercise influence by 
routinely donating to local elections for judges and district attorneys.  
Each year, the U.S. bail bond industry underwrites $14 billion in 
bonds.34  The most surprising fact about the commercial bail 
industry?  The United States and the Philippines are the only two 
countries in the world to have a commercial money bail system that 
operates for profit.35 
B. Historical Context for Risk to Public Safety in the Pretrial 
Decision 
The rise of the money bail system and bail bondsmen was justified 
by the specter of failure to appear and the need to incentivize court 
appearance, otherwise the judicial process would grind to a halt.36  It 
was not until the 1970s and into the 1980s, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided United States v. Salerno and upheld the federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1984, that the notion of public safety became part of 
the rubric of pretrial release and detention.37  The passage of the Bail 
Reform Act — along with several states changing their bail laws to 
consider if a person posed a danger if released — fundamentally 
changed the landscape of pretrial release in a seismic and profound 
way.  Suddenly, two valid pretexts existed to set bail or impose 
pretrial detention — failure to appear and risk to public safety.38 
Today, in the federal legal system and all states except New York, 
judges routinely can and do consider risk to public safety in pretrial 
decisions.39  Normatively speaking, allowing for public safety to 
influence the pretrial decision makes sense.  After all, one of the 
stated goals of the criminal justice system is to deliver safety to people 
and communities harmed by crime.  Indeed, the introduction of 
 
 33. Id. at 14, 33. 
 34. Id. at 21. 
 35. Id. at 17. 
 36. SCHNACKE, MONEY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER, supra note 24, at 
24–26. 
 37. See SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, supra note 21, at 50; see also United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
 38. See SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, supra note 21, at 49. 
 39. See generally Pretrial Policy: State Laws, supra note 7. 
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public safety into the money bail framework came as a response to 
perceived and real increases in crime during the 1970s and 1980s.40 
However, danger and public safety are loaded and subjective 
terms.  On June 17, 1971, in a now-famous speech, Richard Nixon 
declared a war on drugs, calling them “public enemy number one.”41  
Throughout the 1970s, state and local law enforcement cracked down 
on drug enforcement, the most prominent example of which was the 
passage of the Rockefeller drug laws in New York that imposed 
mandatory prison sentences for most drug offenses.42  But the “tough 
on crime” rhetoric was not limited to enforcement and sentencing.  In 
1982, Congress passed the Pretrial Services Act to enhance 
monitoring and supervision for people released pretrial in the federal 
system.43  In 1984, Congress passed another pretrial-related piece of 
legislation, the Bail Reform Act, which formally introduced the 
provision of public safety into the pretrial decision of release or 
detention.44  In the backdrop of these changes was a phrase filled with 
fear, “crime-on-bail” — the concern that someone already out on bail 
would commit new crimes while released pretrial.45  It is clear from 
the legislative history that what constituted risk to public safety was 
not only conduct that involved physical violence or danger.46  Acts 
such as drug trafficking or economic fraud could, the courts held, 
constitute a risk to public safety.47 
 
 40. See TOBORG ASSOC. & NAT’L ASSOC’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, 
PUBLIC DANGER AS FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE 17–20 (1986), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/107930NCJRS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W2N7-NUQU]. 
 41. Richard Nixon Foundation, President Nixon Declares Drug Abuse “Public 
Enemy Number One”, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8TGLLQlD9M [https://perma.cc/ZXJ3-V6JB]. 
 42. See Brian Mann, The Drug Laws that Changed How We Punish, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-
changed-how-we-punish [https://perma.cc/UY3K-GPTH]. 
 43. Donald P. Lay & Jill De La Hunt, The Bail Reform Act of 1984: A 
Discussion, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 929, 930 (1985). 
 44. See id. 
 45. PUBLIC DANGER AS FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 40, at 1. 
 46. See DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUD. CTR, THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984 8 
(3d ed. 2006), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/BailAct3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5C8D-EPQ4]. 
 47. See id. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857 
II. PROBLEMS WITH MONEY BAIL 
A. How History Informs Bail Reform Efforts 
The current momentum for bail reform is driven by a growing 
consensus over the harms of money bail and by research 
demonstrating its inefficacy.  Recent pretrial justice models, such as 
those used in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, and New York City, 
demonstrate that people return to court even without a financial 
stake in their case if, instead, pretrial supports and services are 
provided as needed.48  These models illustrate the point that risk of 
failure to appear can be mitigated with reminders of upcoming court 
dates, assistance with transportation and childcare, and, in cases 
where necessary, more onerous conditions such as pretrial monitoring 
or intensive supervision.49  If we know failure to appear is not a 
rampant problem, and certainly not one that cannot be addressed 
with pretrial services and supports, logic suggests that depriving 
someone of their liberty — by setting a bail amount beyond their 
reach, or by imposing remand or preventive detention — should no 
longer be a valid means of ensuring court appearance pending trial. 
If failure to appear, which is one of two justifications for imposing 
bail or detention, is jettisoned from the calculus, the only basis left to 
take away a person’s liberty is risk to public safety.  From a public 
policy perspective, delivering safety is a valid goal of a pretrial system.  
Yet the current, ubiquitous standard of risk to public safety 
 
 48. Washington, D.C. and New Jersey both have a pretrial system that 
predominantly relies on release or detention, with money bail used in exceptionally 
rare instances. Their recent statistics demonstrate that people released pretrial with 
no bail set return to court at high rates. In FY 2018, Washington, D.C.’s Pretrial 
Services Agency reported a court appearance rate of 89%. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND 
PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST: FISCAL YEAR 2020 15 (2019), 
https://www.csosa.gov/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/2019/03/PSA-FY-2020-
CBJ-Performance-Budget-Request-3-18-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9Z4-S7BD]. In 
New Jersey, the courts reported an 89.4% court appearance rate in 2017. N.J. 
JUDICIARY, JAN 1. – DEC. 31 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 
14 (2019), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=dSE 
[https://perma.cc/Z5EN-4ZLR]. New York City still relies on money bail far more 
heavily than either Washington, D.C., or New Jersey, but in recent years has 
increasingly released people without any bail. In 2017, in New York City, the court 
appearance rate for people released pretrial with no money bail was 86%. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AGENCY, PRETRIAL RELEASE WITHOUT MONEY: NEW YORK CITY, 1987–
2018 9 (2019), https://issuu.com/csdesignworks/docs/cja_rwm_final/2 
[https://perma.cc/LPH2-ET5Q]. 
 49. See, e.g., N.J. JUDICIARY, supra note 48, at 41–42; PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 48, at 15. 
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considered in forty-nine states and the federal system — typically 
embodied by vague and sweeping language such as, “will endanger 
the safety of any other person or the community”50 — leaves too 
much to discretion and can be wielded in harmful ways.51  This overly 
broad standard of public safety has been subject to much recent 
scrutiny in the context of risk assessment instruments that profess to 
predict future dangerousness.52  Yet, little has been said, much less 
actively done, to redefine public safety itself so that vague and broad 
notions are not the legal standard for bail decisions across the vast 
majority of jurisdictions in this country.  If valid concerns about 
overreach, bias, and racism in assessing a public safety risk are not 
addressed, even a new approach to bail based solely on public safety 
stands to replicate, or perhaps only further entrench, the problems 
and biases that plague our existing money bail system. 
In this Part, I question the premise that money bail is needed to 
assure court appearance, and highlight recent research from 
jurisdictions that do not exclusively rely on money bail.  I then turn to 
the issue of public safety and the ethical dilemma of prediction, 
especially in an age of big data and algorithms that could potentially 
guide judges to use their discretion for release, but could also help to 
justify judicial decisions about detention without allowing for 
individualized consideration.  Finally, I highlight the absurdity of 
expecting a money bail system to deliver public safety, even assuming 
arguendo that it serves some purpose of court appearance. 
 
 50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (b) (2008); see also SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, 
supra note 21, at 33 (“The second generation of bail reform (from the 1960s to the 
1980s) focused on the ‘no bail’ side, with a wave of research indicating that there 
were some defendants whom society believed should be detained without bail (rather 
than by using money) due to their perceived dangerousness through documented 
instances of defendants committing crime while released through the bail process. 
That generation culminated with the United States Supreme Court’s approval of a 
federal detention statute, and with states across America changing their constitutions 
and statutes to reflect not only a new constitutional purpose for restricting pretrial 
liberty — public safety — but also detention provisions that followed the Supreme 
Court’s desired formula.”). 
 51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., The Use of Pretrial “Risk Assessments” Instruments: A Shared 
Statement of Civil Rights Concerns, LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/Z7VW-VNEZ]. 
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B. Does Money Bail Even Matter to Court Appearance? 
The idea that money bail mitigates the risk of failure to appear has 
long been axiomatic within this country’s bail system.53  The logic is 
simple — a financial stake in a person’s case means they have an 
incentive to come back to court, otherwise they risk losing their or 
someone else’s money or property.  If that were true, however, one 
would expect dramatically different rates of court appearance when 
people are released under financial conditions versus when they are 
released on their own recognizance or under non-financial conditions. 
New York City has been collecting robust statistics on pretrial 
outcomes for decades.  A look at this data challenges the basic 
assumption that a financial stake necessarily improves the likelihood 
of court appearance. 
Almost a decade ago, New York City’s Criminal Justice Agency 
(CJA) published a study comparing court appearance rates for people 
who paid bail versus those released on their own recognizance.54  
Both cohorts — those who made bail and those released without bail 
— were split into three categories: “recommended,” denoting 
individuals deemed as low risk for failure to appear, “moderate risk,” 
and “not recommended,” denoting individuals who were deemed high 
risk of failure to appear.55  These categories were determined by the 
same factors as those used in New York City courts to guide judges’ 
pretrial decisions: prior criminal history, prior failures to appear, 
having stable housing, employment, a working phone number, if the 
person expected someone to be in court during arraignment, amongst 
others.56  The individuals in each risk bracket, both those released on 
their own recognizance and those who made bail, were tracked over 
time to measure their actual court appearance.57 
 
 53. See SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL, supra note 21, at 59. “At the time, 
the function of bail was limited to setting conditions of pretrial freedom designed to 
provide reasonable assurance of court appearance. Bail is still limited today, although 
the purposes for conditioning pretrial freedom have been expanded to include public 
safety in addition to court appearance.” Id. 
 54. See generally MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, 
RESEARCH BRIEF: HOW RELEASE TYPE AFFECTS FAILURE TO APPEAR (2011). 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. RUSSELL F. FERRI ET AL., N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2016 13 (2018), 
https://issuu.com/csdesignworks/docs/cja_annual_report_2016_27c96a3bf59f13?e=255
0004/59194620 [https://perma.cc/G5FH-24A2] (featuring the most recent annual 
report available). 
 57. PHILLIPS, supra note 54, at 2. 
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At first blush, the results seem to support the axiom that money 
bail has an impact on court appearance.  Overall, it was predicted that 
17% of people released on their own recognizance failed to appear, 
compared to 11% of people released after posting cash bail and 10% 
on commercial bail bonds.58  However, a closer look at the data 
reveals that for people assessed to be low risk, the failure to appear 
rate was 9% for those released on recognizance versus 8% for those 
who made bail.59  In other words, for that cohort, having a financial 
stake in the case had a negligible impact on court appearance.  As a 
person’s assessed risk level increased, there was, unsurprisingly, more 
deviation between failure to appear rates for people released on 
recognizance versus those who made bail.  The data showed 16% 
versus 12% for the “moderate risk” of failure to appear category, 
respectively, and 27% versus 18% for those considered high risk.60  
The takeaway from these statistics is that the factors utilized to assess 
whether someone was “low,” “moderate” or “high risk,” factors such 
as the stability of their housing, having a working phone number, 
employment, and family ties, were a far more meaningful measure of 
one’s likelihood to appear in court than the amount of money at 
stake.61  In effect, it was risk, not money, that drove the court 
appearance rates.  Money was essentially irrelevant in preventing 
against failure to appear. 
A more recent series of experiments in New York City further 
undermines the notion that money bail impacts court appearance.  
Take the Bronx Freedom Fund and the Brooklyn Community Bail 
Fund, both community-based nonprofit organizations in New York 
City that pay bail on behalf of people charged with misdemeanor 
offenses.62  Both bail funds utilize a “revolving” financial model: they 
pay bail for people who need it, get the money back once their cases 
are over, and then re-use those funds to pay bail for others.63  They 
do not charge a fee, require any financial contribution, or ask for a 
 
 58. Id. at 4–5. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. at 6. 
 61. FERRI ET AL., supra note 56, at 13. To learn more about the Criminal Justice 
Agency’s assessment of pretrial risk of failure to appear, see generally id. 
 62. See generally BRONX FREEDOM FUND, http://www.thebronxfreedomfund.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/5ZZT-FJ8J]; BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, 
https://brooklynbailfund.org/ [https://perma.cc/EQ77-YVPG]. 
 63. BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 62; How the Fund Works, BROOKLYN 
CMTY. BAIL FUND, https://brooklynbailfund.org/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/H25J-
XAY4]. 
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deposit from their clients.64  Even accounting for selection bias — 
that the funds only pay bail for people they feel relatively assured will 
return to court — the results are impressive.  Ninety-six percent of 
people served by the Bronx Freedom Fund come back to court for all 
their court dates.65  Of people served by the Brooklyn Community 
Bail Fund, 95% return to court.66  How can the funds explain these 
high rates of court appearance?  They maintain it is the slew of other 
services they provide, such as reminders to appear in court, assistance 
with transportation, or voluntary referrals to address other needs, 
such as housing or public benefits.67 
In 2016, New York City launched a citywide pretrial services 
program called Supervised Release.68  The program serves as an 
alternative to money bail, and provides supervision and monitoring 
for people facing misdemeanor and nonviolent felony charges who 
otherwise may have had bail set.69  Again, no financial conditions of 
release are imposed — people are interviewed at arraignment and, if 
accepted into the program, have a set of requirements to complete, 
such as phone and in-person check-ins.70  Thousands of people have 
benefitted from this program since its beginnings in 2016; over 4,000 
people were served in 2017 alone.71  The New York City Mayor’s 
Office of Criminal Justice, the agency responsible for the Supervised 
Release program, released data comparing the court appearance rates 
of people who were released on recognizance, released after paying 
 
 64. See generally BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 62; How the Fund Works, 
BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, supra note 63. 
 65. See Our Work, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, 
http://www.thebronxfreedomfund.org/ [https://perma.cc/5ZZT-FJ8J]. 
 66. See BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, supra note 62. 
 67. Why Bail, BAIL PROJECT, https://bailproject.org/why-bail/ 
[https://perma.cc/M46S-G27T]. 
 68. See Services: Supervised Release, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, 
https://www.nycja.org/supervised-release/ [perma.cc/B6MJ-WP5J].  It is noteworthy 
that the program begun in Queens in 2009, and has been operating successfully there 
ever since. See id. 
 69. See generally MDRC, VERA INST.  JUST., NEW YORK CITY’S PRETRIAL 
SUPERVISED RELEASE PROGRAM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO BAIL (2017), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/new-york-
citys-pretrial-supervised-release-program/legacy_downloads/Supervised-Release-
Brief-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG6S-W4ZT]. 
 70. Id. at 3 fig.2. 
 71. See N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SUPERVISED RELEASE 
2017 YEAR IN REVIEW SCORECARD (2017), 
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SR-Annual-
Scorecard-2017.pdf [perma.cc/JG2V-B4CX]. 
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bail, and released under the Supervised Release program.72  The 
results are nothing short of fascinating.  People released on their own 
recognizance appeared in court 88% of the time.73  With money bail, 
91%.74  And for people released under Supervised Release, 92% 
appeared in court on their given date.75  The data suggests no 
demonstrable difference between people on Supervised Release 
versus those who made bail.  If anything, Supervised Release resulted 
in a slight improvement in court appearance.76  The data also suggests 
that people released on recognizance only had a slightly lower rate of 
court appearance, by merely 3%, than people who had a financial 
incentive to appear.77  One explanation could be the ubiquitous 
nature of cell phones and the greater ease of maintaining contact with 
people through social media and email compared to over a decade 
ago, when CJA released its study that found a greater difference in 
court appearance between people who paid bail versus those who did 
not.78  Either way, a financial stake is not as relevant to court 
appearance as history and precedent have led us, wrongly, to believe.  
It is high time to undo the bail myth linking money and failure to 
appear. 
C. The Problem of Predicting Violence and the Resort to Pretrial 
Detention 
If money bail were no longer in use and failure to appear were no 
longer a basis for detention, whether a person posed a risk to public 
safety would be the one basis left to determine pretrial release and 
detention. 
But what amounts to a public safety risk and who poses a danger is 
highly fraught, both in its historical implications and practical 
assessment.  The generic formulation for “predicting” violence in the 
federal system, and in most state bail laws, follows three factors: (1) 
the circumstances of the present charge; (2) the accused’s past 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT 16–18 
(2018), http://www.ideas42.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Using-Behavioral-
Science-to-Improve-Criminal-Justice-Outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDX9-
WU5M]. 
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criminal history and conduct; and (3) the accused’s character.79  
Courts have historically used some version of the sum total of these 
factors to label a person as potentially low, medium, or high risk of 
future danger to the community or to another individual, should they 
be released.80 
The problem with prediction, however, is the ever-present 
uncertainty about whether the assessment is accurate.  No one can see 
into a crystal ball and predict the future.  Accuracy has been the main 
basis of criticism against a system of pretrial release that factors in 
risk to public safety using the above approach.  However, even if a 
system tolerated some degree of inaccuracy with calculating risk and 
predicting the future, there remains another criticism — the 
vagueness with which we define risk to public safety.  Concerns over 
bigotry and unfairness in who poses a danger or risk to public safety, 
how that risk is assessed, and the ways in which danger is understood 
cannot be overlooked.81 
Nowhere is this concern more fraught than in the growing use of 
pretrial risk assessment instruments.82  Generally, the critique of them 
is based in an inaccuracy challenge: we cannot predict the future and 
our attempts to do so merely reify existing bias and racism in the 
criminal justice system.  But there is another critique of pretrial risk 
assessment instruments: that the risk to public safety they do purport 
to measure is too vague and too broad to meaningfully predict 
anything about future conduct, and that the right calculus is in fact an 
 
 79. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 
497, 507 (2012). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Tina Luongo & Cherise Fanno Burdeen, Letters to the Editor, Setting 
Bail and Assessing Risk to Public Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/setting-bail-and-assessing-risk-to-public-
safety.html [https://perma.cc/Y2FV-XH5F]; see also Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail 
for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 11–12 (2008); DAVID ARNOLD ET AL., 
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, RACIAL BIAS IN BAIL DECISIONS 26 (2018), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~wdobbie/files/racialbias.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN6Z-
CEHA]. 
 82. The literature on pretrial risk assessment is far too vast and complex to do it 
any measure of justice in this Article.  For a good and balanced overview about 
pretrial risk assessment instruments, see Brandon Buskey & Andrea Woods, Making 
Sense of Pretrial Risk Assessments, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (June 2018), 
https://www.nacdl.org/PretrialRiskAssessment/ [https://perma.cc/W667-7QKU].  See 
also Press Release, Pretrial Justice Inst., New PJI Report Answers Questions About 
Pretrial Assessment (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.pretrial.org/new-pji-report-answers-
questions-about-pretrial-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/7MLM-LDUP].  For a 
scholarly and interesting take on the value of risk assessment instruments, despite 
their shortcomings, see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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individualized consideration of an immediate and imminent threat of 
physical harm to someone. 
Pretrial risk assessment tools — questionnaires based on anywhere 
from six or seven factors to over seventy — are weighted algorithms 
that attempt to predict a person’s likelihood for certain pretrial 
events: court appearance, re-arrest, and, importantly, for potential 
violence.83  A now ubiquitous study released by ProPublica in 2016, 
“Machine Bias,”84 set off a maelstrom of debate over the potential for 
exacerbating bias in the system by relying on these tools.  Proponents 
of the tools see them as a potentially imperfect but useful means for 
guiding judicial discretion away from unfettered and inconsistent 
decision-making.  Notably, some studies showed that risk assessment 
instruments are better at predicting pretrial outcomes, such as failure 
to appear and re-arrest, than judges on their own.85  Others, however, 
note that even if risk assessment instruments had some measurable 
impact on pretrial release initially, over time judges reverted to the 
status quo.  In a study of one of the most well-known pretrial risk 
assessment instruments, the Public Safety Instrument (“PSA”), a 
researcher found that despite an initial increase in pretrial release 
after the PSA was introduced, judges in Kentucky soon reverted to 
their pre-PSA practices and their bail decisions were no longer 
driven, or even guided, to any great extent by the tools.86  Certainly, 
from a standpoint of equity, transparency, and due process, many of 
these tools leave much to be desired.87 
But concerns about bias, predictive parity, and other concepts 
typically associated with the risk assessment debate cloud the real 
 
 83. See, e.g., Risk Factors and Formula, PUB. SAFETY ASSESSMENT, 
https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors [https://perma.cc/96J5-MZGL]. 
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(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23180, 2017), 
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http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf 
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anxiety that either is, or should be, at the heart of the debate about 
risk assessment tools — that these instruments move us away, far 
away, from an individualized consideration of facts to assess if a 
person poses an immediate and imminent physical safety threat.  The 
use of risk assessment tools, like the Compas in the ProPublica article 
or the PSA in over forty jurisdictions in the U.S., reifies a definition 
of risk to public safety that is overly broad and vague and doesn’t 
hone in on the kind of danger that really matters. 
D. The Messiness of Considering Public Safety Within a Money Bail 
System 
The second myth of America’s bail system — that money mitigates 
against risk to public safety — has been decried often by bail 
reformers.88  It seems obvious that a wealthy person accused of the 
same conduct as a poor one is no more or less likely to be a danger to 
society, simply because the wealthy can pay for their freedom while 
the poor cannot.89  Yet this myth is baked into our current money bail 
system when bail is set based on amorphous public safety standards.  
Consider a stark example of this reality: Robert Durst, a real estate 
scion charged with murder in Texas, easily posted his $300,000 bail, a 
tiny sum compared to his vast fortune, and then fled the jurisdiction 
upon release.90  Durst was then accused in subsequent years of gun 
possession in New Orleans, and another murder in Los Angeles.91  
For Durst, a financial stake neither mitigated risk of flight and failure 
to appear, nor did it have any bearing on the threat he posed to public 
safety, which was obviously severe. 
Certainly, Durst is an extreme example, but his story illustrates the 
absurdity of our continued reliance on money bail, especially if risk to 
public safety is a priority.  Research shows that the use of money bail 
has only increased since the introduction of the public safety 
principle, despite no meaningful correlation between money and 
danger.92  According to a study by the U.S. Bureau of Justice 
 
 88. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 86, at 318. 
 89. See id. 
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 91. Id. 
 92. Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21, 25 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2_Reforming-Criminal-
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Statistics, money bail was set in 37% of felony cases in 1990; by 2009, 
that rate rose to 61% of all felony cases.93  Historically, the end result 
of considering risk to public safety as a factor in pretrial bail 
decisions, alongside failure to appear, was a massive boom in jail 
populations across the United States.  In 1970, approximately 160,000 
people were in local county jails.94  By 2010, that number had 
skyrocketed to almost 750,000 on any given day.95  The vast majority 
of that increase was due to pretrial detention.96 
The correlation between having more people in jail and legislation 
allowing judges to consider risk to public safety is uncanny.  As data 
on pretrial decisions do not provide the underlying reasons why 
money bail was set or pretrial detention was imposed, it is impossible 
to tell whether the main driver of this jarring boom in the jail 
population was attributable to concerns over public safety, concerns 
about failure to appear, or both, or something else entirely.  What is 
reasonable to assume, however, is that the permission to consider yet 
another basis for depriving someone of their liberty before trial 
signaled to judges that money bail and preventive detention can and 
should be imposed more often. 
Risk to public safety is as fraught and as complex a standard for the 
pretrial decision as any, and the way pretrial systems have defined 
danger and public safety to date is deeply flawed. Yet, in the face of 
research, history, and public policy, I believe risk to public safety — 
defined and calculated much more narrowly and precisely than the 
status quo — is the only justifiable basis for depriving someone of 
their liberty pretrial.  Below, I will briefly offer a solution for how 
public safety can be refined to avoid some of the pitfalls we have 
seen. 
III. ENDING MASS INCARCERATION BY REFORMING BAIL 
So how does one thread the needle between money bail, failure to 
appear, and public safety?  There is a cautionary tale from recent 
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history in California of a bail bill signed into law in August 2018,97 
and some potentially hopeful lessons from a legislative proposal that 
was introduced but did not pass in the 2019 legislative session in New 
York.98  Both pieces of legislation proposed a full elimination of 
money bail.  On that note alone, they both went further than the 
legislation passed in the two other jurisdictions considered to have 
“ended” money bail — Washington, D.C., thirty years ago, and New 
Jersey just recently — as neither actually banned money bail 
entirely.99 
But eliminating money bail was one of few areas of common 
ground in California and New York’s proposed legislation. 
In California, Senate Bill 10, originally introduced in 2016, 
promised to eliminate money bail and presume release on 
recognizance or non-monetary conditions, such as pretrial supervision 
and supports, for most cases.100  From the start, risk assessment 
instruments were written into the legislation to assess low, medium, 
and high risk of both failure to appear and risk to public safety.  But 
in summer 2018, at the eleventh hour, the framework of the bill was 
changed to allow judges far greater discretion to impose detention on 
a much broader swath of offenses and circumstances.101  Many 
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progressive groups who had originally championed the legislation 
withdrew their support. 
In New York, Governor Cuomo introduced a bill in the 2019 
legislative session that would not only eliminate money bail, but also 
remove discretion from judges to impose detention on most 
misdemeanors, nonviolent felonies, and even some select violent 
felony offenses.102  In other words, the legislation went beyond a 
presumption to a mandate of release in the vast majority of cases.  
The legislation did not require the use of risk assessment instruments 
and even included safeguards and limitations if they were to be used 
by local courts.  With respect to public safety, a factor that is not a 
part of New York’s current bail statute, the Governor proposed the 
following basis for detention: if the person poses a “current risk to the 
physical safety of a reasonably identifiable person or persons.”  This 
consideration of public safety only applied in cases involving some 
violent felony charges, domestic violence, and a handful of other 
serious offenses. 
The legislation that passed in California is a prime example of the 
type of reform to avoid if the central goal of bail reform is 
decarceration, or fewer people in jail.  The proposal introduced in 
New York, even though it ultimately failed, is in many ways the first 
real model legislation to both eliminate the use of failure to appear as 
a basis for detention and carefully narrow what constitutes a danger 
or risk to public safety.  While not perfect, it is the kind of bail reform 
that will meaningfully end mass incarceration. 
A. California and the Cautionary Tale of Senate Bill 10 
In August 2018, then Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Senate 
Bill 10, hailed by many as the first bill nationally to fully eliminate 
cash bail.103  The crisis of bail in California, as in much of the country, 
is one of epic proportions.  On a single day in 2015, California had 
over 200,000 people in jail, with two-thirds held pretrial.104  Judges 
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traditionally set bail according to a schedule, a predetermined amount 
of money bail imposed based upon charge, prior criminal history, and 
other narrow factors.105  The vast majority of people who do make 
bail in California’s courts do so using a bail bondsman.106 
Senate Bill 10 was originally introduced in December 2016107 to 
much fanfare and support from a wide cross-section of stakeholders, 
including traditional criminal justice policy makers, advocates, 
grassroots organizations, and legislators.108  Unlike New York, 
California’s statutory scheme allowed judges to set bail on the basis of 
both factors — risk of flight and public safety  — and neither of those 
grounds were contested or challenged in and of themselves.109  From 
the beginning, to win the full elimination of money bail a concession 
was made by some opponents of risk assessment instruments that 
those tools would be explicitly written into the new bail legislation.  
That concession was made with the understanding that the risk 
assessment tools would be used to justify and inform conditions of 
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release, not to impose or require detention, and that release was 
mandated on low-level charges regardless of potential risk level.110 
All appeared to be going to plan until, at the last minute, several 
amendments were added to Senate Bill 10 that limited the categories 
of charges mandated for release and gave judges close to unfettered 
discretion to impose detention, especially on cases deemed medium 
or high risk, as determined by the risk assessment instrument now 
required by law. These amendments caused much consternation and 
dismay among original champions of Senate Bill 10, and ultimately 
led to many withdrawing support.111  Central to their concerns was 
the potential for Senate Bill 10 to actually result in more, not fewer, 
people in jail because of the broad detention eligibility net and the 
unchecked discretion to impose detention under the revised 
proposal.112 
Senate Bill 10 passed and was signed into law by then Governor 
Jerry Brown on August 28, 2018.  Yet the reaction to it from 
advocates and many supporters of bail reform ranged from muted to 
downright critical.  Today, Senate Bill 10 is facing repeal in a ballot 
referendum in November 2020 and the money bail system California 
has known for decades still exists.113  What should have been an 
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overwhelming success for bail reform ended up serving as a 
cautionary tale for others. 
B. New York and the Hope of a Narrower Standard of Detention 
and Public Safety 
From the beginning, learning from the mistakes of California’s 
Senate Bill 10, Governor Cuomo’s proposed 2019 legislation to 
reform bail in New York took a very different approach to the 
contours and precepts underlying pretrial release and detention. 
For one, the Governor’s proposal mandated release, not simply a 
presumption of release, for a significant swath of offenses — from 
misdemeanors, to nonviolent felonies, and even some common 
violent felonies such as assault, robbery, and burglary in the second 
degree.114  A mandated approach that eliminates prosecutorial and 
judicial discretion to detain is a significant departure from the kinds 
of bail legislation that have passed, not just in California, but in places 
like New Jersey, which required a presumption, but not a mandate, of 
release.   
A second difference is that the Governor’s proposed approach to 
public safety only applied to a limited number of charges — some 
violent felonies, domestic violence, and other serious offenses — and 
did not depend on the use of a risk assessment instrument.  In fact, 
the legislation explicitly prohibited risk to public safety from being 
determined by an assessment tool.115  Rather, the proposed standard, 
if triggered by a serious charge of a violent felony, domestic violence, 
and the like, was a narrow consideration — if a person posed an 
immediate threat to the physical safety of another.116 
Why this different approach?  One key substantive distinction is 
that, again, unlike California,  New York’s existing bail statute started 
from a unique place of only allowing judges to consider risk of failure 
to appear, and not risk to public safety, as all forty-nine other states 
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and the federal bail system do.117  The introduction of a 
dangerousness provision in Governor Cuomo’s proposed bill, 
however carefully crafted and limited, was hugely controversial 
among New York’s advocates and policy makers118 and was 
ultimately shelved in favor of a bill that left in cash bail for serious 
offenses but still did not include public safety.119 
Regardless of the outcome, New York’s unique starting point for 
bail reform helped to drive a conversation about the merits of 
considering failure to appear and what constitutes danger and a risk 
to public safety well beyond what anyone had seen before in previous 
bail reform efforts.  As the very last state to consider adding risk to 
public safety to the bail statute, New York had the benefit of learning 
from other jurisdictions and thereby avoiding their mistakes.  
Another substantive distinction is that New York had its own proof of 
concept, in New York City, as an example that more pretrial release 
can in fact result in more public safety.120  In New York City, the use 
of bail overall has declined tremendously in recent years, creating 
momentum and support for provisions that go beyond what any other 
state had proposed to end mass incarceration and limit the use of 
pretrial detention.121 
Learning from the cautionary tale of California, Governor 
Cuomo’s proposed legislation not only eliminated money bail 
entirely, but took jail off the table as an option for a majority of 
offenses, especially lower-level ones.122  As a starting point, that alone 
would guarantee decarceration as judges routinely set bail at amounts 
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beyond people’s reach on misdemeanor and other low-level offenses 
in the fifty-seven counties outside of New York City.123  Eliminating 
both money bail and jail meant that judges simply cannot detain 
people charged on those misdemeanors, nonviolent felonies, and 
select violent felony offenses, even if they are deemed a high risk of 
flight or likely to not appear in court.  The idea was that pretrial 
services, including court notification, monitoring, and the like, would 
mitigate that particular risk.  The radical notion underlying this 
mandate of release was, at its core, to eliminate pretrial discretion 
entirely from prosecutors and judges to detain on the vast majority of 
charges.  New York clearly learned a lesson from California’s much-
criticized last minute amendments to Senate Bill 10 that further 
enhanced judicial discretion to impose detention. 
Second, the Governor’s proposal called for judges to be able to 
consider risk to public safety as a basis for detention in a unique, 
specific way, limited to only the most serious of offenses and only 
after an individualized, fact-specific hearing.124  This proposal would 
have been deemed progressive in any other jurisdiction, but given 
that New York is the only state that continues to reject Salerno and a 
consideration of public safety, this part of the proposal was a third rail 
and ultimately derailed the Governor’s effort. 
A little bit of history about risk to public safety in New York is 
helpful context here.  In 1970 and again in 1981, New York legislators 
considered adding risk to public safety to the bail statute but rejected 
it both times, noting the likely role of racial bias and bigotry in the 
determination of who was a threat to the public’s safety.125  In the 
Governor’s 2019 proposal, he noted that under the current law judges 
considered public safety covertly and set high bail to detain people 
who they suspected were a danger.126  These decisions were made sub 
rosa and subject to the whims, perceptions, and biases of individual 
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judges.  In support of his proposal, Governor Cuomo reasoned that 
explicitly introducing a consideration of public safety would eliminate 
the secrecy of those decisions now and help to balance the calculus of 
what and who was considered a public safety risk.127  Setting aside the 
contentiousness of the proposal for a moment, the most important 
thing to note is that the Governor’s proposal did what no other state 
has done before: formulate a very narrow, careful definition of public 
safety, which is not so broad as to encompass all kinds of behaviors, 
and is fact-specific enough to necessitate a real hearing and not be 
satisfied by some algorithmic assessment.128  The specific language 
the Governor’s proposal called for with respect to public safety was 
that someone be deemed “a current threat to the physical safety of a 
reasonably identifiable person or persons.”129  That language was 
notably different from what has been proposed and passed as 
legislation elsewhere.  Compare it, for example, to “a credible threat 
to the safety of a person or community,” the typical language adopted 
as the basis for determining risk to public safety in other 
jurisdictions.130 
Why is this important?  Both bills in California and New York 
actually eliminate money bail.  But, as these two examples 
demonstrate, that alone will not result in a more just pretrial system 
and fewer people in jail.  California’s elimination of money bail may 
have actually removed the one safety valve — being able to afford 
money bail — that saved people from unnecessary pretrial detention.  
New York’s proposal, on the other hand, would have simply 
mandated release in most cases with debate only over the appropriate 
conditions to assure pretrial success in the community.  Further, the 
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bail reform effort in California did nothing to attack California’s 
overly broad and troubling definition of risk to public safety, leaving 
in place a vague standard that could sweep in a wide range of 
behaviors, both those that actually pose a real risk to someone’s 
physical safety and the many acts that clearly do not.  New York’s 
proposed legislation, in contrast, consciously provided an explicit 
definition of this amorphous term.  Even though it did not pass, this 
proposal can serve as a model for eliminating some of the potential 
for bias and harm in what has become a ubiquitous public safety 
standard in bail systems across the country. 
CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR STATUTORY REFORM ELSEWHERE 
There are dozens of other jurisdictions considering bail reform 
each year, and for them the lessons from California and New York 
are critically important to study, absorb and turn into concrete 
strategies on the ground. 
For the forty-nine states and the federal system, this is first and 
foremost an opportunity to revisit the standard of public safety that 
was passed in the wake of our “tough on crime” and “war on drugs” 
era, and to narrow this standard carefully to a much more tailored, 
careful definition.  For the forty-eight states left to eliminate money 
bail entirely, there is a model for eliminating money bail the right way 
— by mandating release for the vast majority of offenses and 
eliminating the role that risk of failure to appear plays in justifying 
decisions of detention. 
For jurisdictions looking for the right way to assess release and 
detention, New York’s proposed legislation provides two important 
lessons beyond the standards of risk of failure to appear and public 
safety.  The first is to not be afraid to simply legislate away discretion 
and mandate release on as wide a swath of cases as politically 
possible.  It is the only foolproof way to guarantee that a reform bill 
will be enacted as intended.  Second, New York contended with the 
risk assessment debate by explicitly prohibiting its use for justifying 
detention, and by explicitly allowing its use to determine conditions of 
release. 
 
